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CRIMINAL CORPORATE CHARACTER 
Robert E. Wagner* 
Abstract 
In the last few years, corporations have been accused of crimes 
ranging from environmental pollution on an unprecedented scale, to 
manslaughter, to election tampering, to large-scale antitrust violations. 
Many of these accused companies had previously committed similar 
acts or even the exact same offense. Unfortunately, the rules of evidence 
in the federal system and in virtually every state system prohibit the use 
of this information in a prosecution for such crimes. The reasons for this 
prohibition are based in historical anomalies, a mistaken understanding 
of corporate function, and a misplaced anthropomorphism of the 
corporation. This combination of errors has resulted in the questionable 
practice of excluding relevant evidence in cases where the justifications 
for exclusion are either nonexistent or weak and the benefits of 
admitting the evidence clearly prevail. This Article demonstrates the 
fallacies of this continued practice and argues in favor of change. 
Specifically, this Article shows why evidence concerning the character 
of a corporation should be allowed in criminal settings to prove that the 
corporation acted in conformity with that character on the date in 
question. Courts so far have not given much consideration to the 
question and have simply assumed that the character evidence rules 
apply to corporations. I base my objections to this practice on the goals 
of corporate criminal liability, the inherent weaknesses of the character 
evidence rules generally, and the way in which corporate structure 
exacerbates those weaknesses. Lawyers should argue that the character 
evidence rules do not apply to corporations, judges should decide 
accordingly, and legislatures should amend both the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and their state counterparts to make it unambiguously clear 
that corporations are not covered by the same principles regarding 
character as individuals.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Rules of Evidence and most state evidentiary rules 
contain a prohibition against using an individual’s past acts as evidence 
of his character when prosecutors attempt to prove that the individual 
behaved in a way consistent with that character in a particular instance.1 
For example, if a prosecutor is trying to prove that a defendant killed a 
man last month, she cannot introduce evidence that he killed a different, 
unrelated man last year and argue that since he is the type of person 
who kills, he probably killed the second man as well. This Article 
argues that this prohibition should not apply in criminal trials of 
corporations. The past acts of a corporation should be admissible to add 
weight to the proposition that it committed the offense in question in 
conformity with its so-called character.  
In making this argument, I look at two long-standing questions of 
criminal law and the rules of evidence, and I examine how the 
intersection of the answers to these questions should shape the treatment 
of corporate character evidence. The first question deals with corporate 
criminal liability and why we prosecute corporations. Prosecutions of 
these types of legally created entities often result in the punishment of 
real people such as investors or employees who have committed no 
wrong. The second question concerns the evidence that can be used in 
criminal trials generally, and specifically seeks to explore the 
prohibition on the use of character evidence to show that someone acted 
in conformity with his character. Why do we exclude information from 
                                                                                                                     
 1. FED. R. EVID. 404. 
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a trial that many people agree is probative and in fact everybody uses in 
daily decision making? This Article argues that examining these 
questions yields significant arguments for eliminating the prohibition on 
the use of character evidence against corporations. 
As part of this project, I employ the key insights of Professor Peter 
French on the topic of corporate decision making and his explanations 
of the fundamental mechanisms that underlie this process as part of a 
model that he termed the Corporate Internal Decision (CID) Structure.2 
I use this structure as one basis upon which to reject the application of 
the character evidence rules to corporations. In addition, I also use 
information relating to corporate recidivism rates and the inherent 
limitations of corporate criminal penalties to support my argument. 
There are multiple advantages to adopting my understanding of the 
character evidence rules as they apply to corporations. These 
advantages are present in two of the primary purposes of evidentiary 
law: finding truth and establishing desirable incentives. I argue that the 
truth-finding function is enhanced by allowing more information to be 
presented to a jury in circumstances in which the evidence is likely to be 
more probative than prejudicial. The advantage of establishing desirable 
incentives is enhanced by the fact that using evidence of past acts 
against corporations will increase the deterrent effect on them whenever 
they consider criminal conduct. Other scholars have asked how legal 
regimes can encourage optimal board behavior,3 but none have asked 
how the rules of evidence may play a role in this incentive structure. 
This Article fills that gap. 
In addition to these increased advantages of allowing character 
evidence against corporations as opposed to individuals, the potential 
disadvantages are also reduced in the corporate context. One of the 
largest and most recognized potential harms related to using character 
evidence is the risk of erroneously subjecting an individual to 
incarceration.4 This is not a problem here due to the fact that a 
corporation obviously cannot be sentenced to imprisonment. 
Furthermore, use of corporate character evidence is less likely than 
individual character evidence to produce inaccurate results in the first 
place. Given these increased advantages and decreased disadvantages, I 
argue that it would be legitimate to exclude corporations from the 
character evidence prohibition without doing so for individuals. 
Part I discusses corporate criminal liability generally and reviews the 
                                                                                                                     
 2. See infra Part II. 
 3. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate 
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002) (discussing legal issues surrounding board size, 
meeting procedures, and director liability). 
 4. See People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 293–94 (N.Y. 1901) (citation omitted). 
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arguments supporting and opposing it. I show that both the proponents 
of expanding and those of limiting corporate criminal liability would 
likely favor my proposal to change the rules of evidence. I explain the 
motives behind imposing corporate criminal liability and demonstrate 
how the legal system has attempted to meet those goals. Relatedly, I 
will examine how the use of respondeat superior as a basis for liability 
has been implemented, and why commentators have recommended 
changes to existing liability standards. Part II investigates in more detail 
the nature of corporations, especially their decision making processes. 
After concluding this foundational inquiry regarding corporations, Part 
III clarifies the character evidence rules and their prohibitions, and 
discusses the arguments for and against eliminating those rules 
generally. This Part also illuminates whether and how these rules are 
and should be applied to corporations in the future. In this context, I 
analyze not only the reasons for the rules but also the reasons for having 
corporate criminal liability in the first place, as well as some of the 
distinctions between people and corporations. I conclude that the 
character evidence rules should be understood not to apply to 
corporations in criminal prosecutions. 
I.  CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
Both the existence and appropriate level of corporate criminal 
liability have been debated since its inception over a century ago.5 
Before that time, corporations were not subject to the criminal law. 
William Blackstone believed that this was “so obvious that it needed no 
elaboration.”6 When addressing the question in 1701, American courts 
held that only individuals could be charged criminally.7 In 1909, the 
United States Supreme Court finally established corporate criminal 
liability and used the respondeat superior principle to establish guilt in 
New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States.8 
Today, a corporation can be held criminally liable for virtually any 
                                                                                                                     
 5. See Amy J. Sepinwall, Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of Responsibility 
in the Face of Corporate Crime, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 411, 415 (2012); see also V.S. Khanna, 
Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1478 n.2 
(1996). 
 6. Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1363 (2009) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *476 
(“A corporation cannot commit treason, or felony, or other crime.”)). 
 7. Kathleen F. Brickey, Perspectives on Corporate Criminal Liability 3 (Wash. U. in St. 
Louis Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-01-02, 2012), available at http://ssrn.c 
om/abstract=1980346. 
 8. 212 U.S. 481, 493–95 (1909). For a discussion of the case, see Erin Sheley, 
Perceptual Harm and the Corporate Criminal, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) 
(manuscript at 5–8), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2022379. 
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crimes, except those requiring commission by a natural person,9 such as 
rape.10 Nonetheless, the debate about corporate criminal liability rages 
on, and its opponents perceive the practice “as the senseless and puerile 
reaction of an ignorant public, or as an inefficient relic best replaced by 
a civil scheme.”11 Why do some commentators view matters in this 
light? 
The main point of contention becomes not whether harm has 
occurred, but rather who should pay for that harm. Some courts have 
claimed that saying that a corporation has committed a wrong actually 
means only that someone at a high decision making level in the 
corporation has done so.12 Shareholders have virtually no say in the 
management of their corporation; rather, the ultimate authority rests 
with the board, and the day-to-day operations are conducted by other 
corporate officials.13 Therefore, one could argue that either the 
managers or employees should be held liable, but not the corporation, 
and thus it is unfair to punish the shareholders by imposing criminal 
penalties on the whole entity.14 A logical conclusion depending upon 
how the corporation is viewed is that “corporations don’t commit 
crimes, people do.”15 Hence, corporate criminal liability punishes 
innocent shareholders and employees who thus become “collateral 
damage.”16  
This issue was raised in New York Central when the defendants 
argued that punishing the corporation was actually punishing the 
innocent stockholders, and that since the board could not legally 
authorize criminal acts, it was impossible for the corporation as an 
entity to commit a crime.17 They were potentially relying on the 
historically held belief that a corporation was not capable of possessing 
the moral blameworthiness necessary to perpetrate an intentional 
crime.18 The Supreme Court, however, rejected these claims and held 
                                                                                                                     
 9. A natural person has been defined as “[a] human being, as distinguished from an 
artificial person created by law.” Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Precedent Cos., 782 N.E.2d 470, 476 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citation omitted). 
 10. Khanna, supra note 5, at 1488. 
 11. Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 3), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2046593. 
 12. See, e.g., Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., Engine Div., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 
1986). 
 13. Carol R. Goforth, “A Corporation Has No Soul”—Modern Corporations, Corporate 
Governance, and Involvement in the Political Process, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 617, 629 (2010). 
 14. Miriam H. Baer, Organizational Liability and the Tension Between Corporate and 
Criminal Law, 19. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 5–6 (2010). 
 15. Brickey, supra note 7, at 2.  
 16. Alschuler, supra note 6, at 1359. 
 17. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492 (1909). 
 18. See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
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that since a corporation acts through its officers and agents, their 
purposes, motivations, and intentions are also those of the corporation.19 
This established the use of respondeat superior, a principle of liability 
from tort law, as a viable criminal law theory. After New York Central, 
commentators objected that corporate criminal liability ran against the 
purpose of criminal law, that is, “punishment of the morally 
blameworthy—because it relied upon vicarious guilt rather than 
personal fault.”20 Others felt that the respondeat superior standard for 
criminal liability was “overly broad.”21 For instance, under some 
circumstances the federal government and a number of states impose 
liability on the corporation for the actions of any employee, even if the 
employee was instructed not to perform the action or if the corporation 
was a victim.22 Some corporate convictions have been based on 
seemingly individual actions, with catastrophic results for the 
corporation and its employees (such as the collapse of Arthur Anderson, 
which resulted in the loss of 85,000 jobs) that are not rectified even if 
the conviction is later reversed.23 The current practice of conviction 
without reference to corporate character reduces the amount of 
intentionality that can legitimately be ascribed to the conduct, which 
blurs the line between civil and criminal liability and dilutes the impact 
of criminal convictions.24 By not using corporate intent, we “squander[] 
the power of the criminal law.”25  
Professors Daniel Fischel and Alan Sykes have argued that corporate 
criminal liability is unnecessary and in fact can lead to overdeterrence, 
whereby corporations spend more money avoiding crime than they 
should.26 Nonetheless, while corporations are a necessary part of 
modern life and bring many advantages, they also have the ability to 
cause great harm.27 With the exception of governments, corporations are 
the most powerful institutions in the world, and are sometimes even 
more powerful than governments.28 Corporate actions and policies have 
                                                                                                                     
CRIME & JUSTICE 259, 259 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002). 
 19. N.Y. Cent., 212 U.S. at 492–93. 
 20. Khanna, supra note 5, at 1485 (citations omitted).  
 21. Sheley, supra note 8, at 4. 
 22. See, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 970 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998); United States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 23. Alschuler, supra note 6, at 1364–66. 
 24. Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1099–1100 (1991). 
 25. Id. at 1183–84. 
 26. Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 321 
(1996). 
 27. Gilchrist, supra note 11, at 2. 
 28. Goforth, supra note 13, at 618 (citation omitted).  
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contributed to, if not caused, many environmental and other types of 
disasters.29 Corporations are capable of committing crimes far in excess 
of what individuals can achieve due to their size, resources, and 
complexity.30 Those who argue in favor of criminal sanctions for 
corporations identify the harms that corporate misconduct can cause, 
mention the “expressive value of punishing corporations,” and argue 
that in light of societal perceptions, failing to punish corporations could 
“delegitimiz[e] the criminal law.”31 Corporate criminal liability may be 
appropriate due to the “collective qualities” of corporations—that is, 
their “geographic, structural, and temporal complexities”—that amplify 
the potential harm caused and thereby justify criminal liability.32 
Professor Pamela Bucy also argues that we should criminalize corporate 
behavior due not only to the large amount of harm corporations can 
cause, but also the “unique opportunities for unlawful behavior” arising 
from corporations’ organizational structures.33  
Other commentators have stated that corporations are just legal 
fictions that refer to the people and agreements behind the organizations 
and, therefore, any liability should attach to these individuals.34 Yet this 
understanding has been objected to on several different grounds, 
including the observation that corporations have cultures that differ 
from those of the individuals in them.35 Furthermore, due to the nature 
of a large corporation and possible complexity of its various hierarchies, 
it can be difficult to determine which one individual may have violated 
the law.36 Just prosecuting individuals for their acts can be problematic 
from an incentives perspective, not only because it may be difficult to 
identify the persons responsible for the criminal action, but also because 
it may not be possible to overcome the internal pressures created by the 
corporation.37 
In some situations it is not individuals alone who perpetrate the 
crimes, but rather a corporation’s standard operating procedure or a part 
of its business strategy plays a role in it.38 A corporation’s culture and 
                                                                                                                     
 29. Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to 
the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 119 (2009). 
 30. Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1484 (2009). 
 31. Sheley, supra note 8, at 3 (citations omitted). 
 32. Id. at 4. 
 33. Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Criminal Liability: When Does it Make Sense?, 46 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1437, 1437 (2009). 
 34. See Gilchrist, supra note 11, at 15. 
 35. See id. at 15–16. 
 36. Brickey, supra note 7, at 22. 
 37. Bucy, Corporate Ethos, supra note 24, at 1119. 
 38. See, e.g., Beale, supra note 30, at 1484 (citing the engineering giant Siemens’ 
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customs can, to varying degrees, affect individuals’ attitudes and 
behaviors.39 Attributing the criminal behavior of corporations to the 
individual alone may disregard the institutional processes occurring 
within the organization.40 Corporate culture and organizational structure 
can influence individual decision making in many relevant ways.41 It 
has long been acknowledged that the policies of some corporations can 
encourage criminal behavior.42 One infamous example of corporate 
misconduct clearly related to corporate character was Big Tobacco’s 
long-time pattern of misleading regulators and the public about the 
health risks involved in smoking.43 Sometimes “it is appropriate not to 
ask ‘What was going on with those people to make them act that way?’ 
but instead to ask ‘What was going on in that organization that made 
people act that way?’”44 When dealing with an organization, it is not 
enough for discrete individuals to exercise self-control; rather, control 
must be part of the organization.45 
Corporate criminal liability has also been defended as an appropriate 
“expression of the community’s moral judgment.”46 The idea is that if 
we do not hold a corporation criminally liable when people think we 
should, then the criminal justice system itself will be weakened due to 
appearances of favoritism and unequal application of the law.47 
Furthermore, people do seem to experience “greater moral indignation 
toward corporations than toward natural persons for the same crimes.”48 
A final argument in favor of corporate criminal liability is based on the 
fact that corporations that adhere to the law are sometimes at a 
competitive disadvantage compared to corporations that disregard the 
                                                                                                                     
systemic use of bribes as one example). 
 39. Ripken, supra note 29, at 103. 
 40. Charles R.P. Pouncy, Reevaluating Corporate Criminal Responsibility: It’s All About 
Power, 41 STETSON L. REV. 97, 110 (2011). 
 41. See Goforth, supra note 13, at 634 (identifying increased risk taking, team playing at 
the expense of good judgment, and cutting corners). 
 42. See MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 58 (2006). 
 43. See generally Peter Pringle, The Chronicles of Tobacco: An Account of the Forces 
that Brought the Tobacco Industry to the Negotiating Table, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 387 
(1999). 
 44. Goforth, supra note 13, at 648 (citation omitted). 
 45. Elizabeth R. Sheyn, The Humanization of the Corporate Entity: Changing Views of 
Corporate Criminal Liability in the Wake of Citizens United, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 6 (2010). 
 46. Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation, 
46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1427 (2009). 
 47. Gilchrist, supra note 11, at 56. 
 48. Id. at 57; see also Susanna M. Kim, Characteristics of Soulless Persons: The 
Applicability of the Character Evidence Rule to Corporations, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 763, 792 
(2000) (“People often search for group rather than individual-level causes for extremely 
negative events.”). 
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law.49 If we did not have criminal sanctions, these law-abiding 
corporations would be placed at an even greater disadvantage. 
The availability of civil corrective measures further complicates the 
question of the appropriateness of criminal sanctions. Some scholars 
think that corporate misconduct can be controlled through civil 
enforcement while others believe that civil fines cannot replicate the 
reputational harm of criminal sanctions.50 Furthermore, some find the 
unpredictability associated with reputational damage stemming from a 
criminal conviction to be advantageous,51 whereas others view this 
advantage as lessened by “imprecision and lack of uniformity.”52 Even 
though objections to criminal sanctions remain, commentators and 
practitioners who favor them have claimed that prosecution of 
corporations should actually be simplified.53 To understand this debate, 
it is best to take a step back and examine in more detail the general 
goals that criminal sanctions are intended to achieve. 
A.  The Purpose of Corporate Criminal Liability 
The classic goals of criminal law are deterrence, retribution, 
rehabilitation, and incapacitation.54 The United States Supreme Court 
has held not only that deterrence is an appropriate purpose of criminal 
liability, but also that corporations can appropriately be considered 
blameworthy and, therefore, retribution would be another justification 
for corporate criminal liability.55 The expression of condemnation is 
another possible purpose of criminal law. There is clearly a wide range 
of levels of condemnation for various criminal acts, but some 
condemnation is consistently present and many have argued that this 
expression has a value beyond any deterrent effect that may be 
associated with it.56 A possible goal of criminal law is to both convey 
                                                                                                                     
 49. Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability: 
Containing the Machine Through the Corporate Death Penalty, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 942 
(2005). 
 50. See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 
473, 512–16 (2006).  
 51. See id. at 514. 
 52. Gilchrist, supra note 11, at 42. 
 53. See, e.g., Beale, supra note 30, at 1482. 
 54. Brickey, supra note 7, at 14; Sheley, supra note 8, at 6. 
 55. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673 (1975). 
 56. Gilchrist, supra note 11, at 5; see also Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the 
Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 619 (1998) (arguing that the public wants 
to see condemnation of both individuals and corporations through the criminal law and that 
imposing criminal sanctions therefore increases public welfare). For a discussion of the 
expressive function of criminal liability in the intellectual property context, see Irina D. Manta, 
The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
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society’s feelings of condemnation for certain types of behavior and 
help shape those feelings.57 Arguments are often made, however, that 
neither expression nor retribution are proper goals. Many scholars and 
judges treat deterrence as the goal for corporate criminal liability,58 and 
some scholars have even claimed that the “chief civilized purpose of 
criminal law is deterrence.”59  
Deterrence can be broken down into both general and specific 
deterrence. The idea of general deterrence is that punishing one person 
or entity will convince other people or entities not to behave in the same 
manner.60 Unlike general deterrence, specific deterrence is aimed at the 
actual person or institution that committed the offense and attempts to 
prevent that entity from committing the same or similar acts in the 
future.61 To argue from a deterrence perspective, we need to show that 
corporate criminal liability deters more than individual liability alone.62 
In this context, it is important to understand the specific factors that 
affect decision making behavior. In a survey of corporate ethics, 
“superiors” were ranked as the most important contributing factor to 
criminal or unethical decision making.63 In that spirit, criminal liability 
is supposed to “stimulat[e] a maximum effort” on the parts of owners 
and managers in their responsibility to direct their numerous agents in 
compliance with the law.64 
In that same spirit of maximizing utility, “[a] judge’s goal in 
punishing a corporation should be to induce a level of monitoring that 
will prevent more criminal harm than the monitoring will cost.”65 
Corporate liability may thus also be thought of as a way to induce 
internal monitoring as opposed to serving only as an external 
constraint.66 Furthermore, the problem of corporate crime is seemingly 
contagious and, for example, in the last decade just about every major 
pharmaceutical company has been charged and has pled guilty or agreed 
to a settlement based upon serious misconduct.67 While potentially 
                                                                                                                     
469, 494 (2011). 
 57. See generally Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law 
as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1 (1990). 
 58. See, e.g., Khanna, supra note 5, at 1494 & nn.91–93. 
 59. Henry W. Edgerton, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 36 YALE L.J. 827, 833 
(1927). 
 60. Brickey, supra note 7, at 14. 
 61. Id. at 16. 
 62. Khanna, supra note 5, at 1494–95.   
 63. CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 42, at 59. 
 64. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1972)  
 65. Alschuler, supra note 6, at 1360. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Beale, supra note 30, at 1484 (citation omitted).  
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overstating the problem, the U.S. Supreme Court made a relevant point 
when it said that “to give [corporations] immunity from all punishment 
because of the old and exploded doctrine that a corporation cannot 
commit a crime would virtually take away the only means of effectually 
controlling the subject matter and correcting the abuses aimed at.”68 
Today, there are many administrative agencies and extended civil 
liability that could work to curtail corporate misconduct. 
Notwithstanding this fact, criminal liability has not only survived but 
has actually increased dramatically.69 This is in part because of its 
capability to simultaneously achieve “consequential, retributive and 
expressive benefits.”70 Whichever purpose (or combination of purposes) 
we choose, we are still left with the question of how optimally to 
achieve it via the toolkit of corporate criminal liability.  
B.  Achieving the Goals of Corporate Criminal Liability 
After New York Central, whenever corporations were prosecuted, 
courts used respondeat superior to establish liability without much 
additional analysis.71 In New York Central, the statute had explicitly 
stated that a corporation could be held liable.72 After the Supreme 
Court’s ruling, however, lower courts began reading other criminal 
statutes as though they applied to corporations whether there was any 
indication that the legislature had intended them to do so or not.73 Under 
the respondeat superior standard, a corporation can be held criminally 
liable if three conditions are satisfied: (1) an agent of the corporation 
acted with the requisite mental state, (2) the agent acted within the 
scope of his employment, and (3) the agent intended to benefit the 
corporation.74 
Some federal courts have imposed liability upon a corporation based 
on a theory of collective mens rea, where no specific individual had that 
mens rea, resulting in company liability even though no culpable 
individual could be identified.75 Indeed, all of the elements of criminal 
corporate liability are easily met for a variety of reasons. For example, 
an agent can act within the scope of employment even though the 
                                                                                                                     
 68. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495–96 (1909). 
 69. Baer, supra note 14, at 4. 
 70. Id. at 2. 
 71. Alschuler, supra note 6, at 1364. 
 72. N.Y. Cent., 212 U.S. at 491. 
 73. See, e.g., United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 54–55 (1909); London v. 
Everett H. Dunbar Corp., 179 F. 506, 510 (1st Cir. 1910); People v. Star Co., 120 N.Y.S. 498, 
500 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909); State v. Ice & Fuel Co., 81 S.E. 737, 738 (N.C. 1914). 
 74. Khanna, supra note 5, at 1489–90. 
 75. Michael B. Metzger & Dan R. Dalton, Seeing the Elephant: An Organizational 
Perspective on Corporate Moral Agency, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 489, 501 (1996). 
11
Wagner: Criminal Corporate Character
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
1304 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
corporation had forbidden the wrongful conduct. Furthermore, the agent 
could have intended to “benefit the corporation” when that was not his 
only motivation and he had ultimately not benefitted the corporation at 
all.76 Nevertheless, some argue that even potentially excessive 
prosecutions of a corporation, which punish it for employee actions that 
are against its publicized policy, can help to deter such acts and 
encourage the corporation to implement effective measures rather than 
empty policy declarations.77 The fear is that a corporation can impose 
seemingly good compliance programs without actually affecting the 
culture or the desire to comply with the law.78 In recognition of this 
possibility, courts usually do not acknowledge even extensive 
compliance programs as a defense to the illegal conduct, even if it was 
committed by only one employee.79 
Nevertheless, as desirable as avoiding criminal behavior may be, 
extreme penalties can cause overdeterrence and lead to an excessive 
increase in corporate resources devoted to enforcement.80 Furthermore, 
when convicted—or possibly even only accused—of a crime, a 
corporation can suffer significant consequences in addition to the 
criminal charges or fines themselves, including loss of the ability to 
conduct the business in which it had been involved and a significant 
negative impact on its stock prices and other business opportunities it 
may have had.81 Some scholars, legislators, and practitioners have 
recognized this danger and have argued for limiting the scope of 
liability to actions that can be traced to people high up in the 
corporation such as executive managers or members of the board of 
directors.82 For example, Australia has passed legislation imposing new 
forms of liability that focus on the culture of the corporation or the 
inadequate management rather than on the simpler respondeat superior 
approach.83 Similarly, some English laws require a corporate “alter 
ego,” usually meaning a high-up official in the corporation.84 
 
                                                                                                                     
 76. Khanna, supra note 5, at 1490. Practically speaking, prosecutors do consider whether 
or not it was a “rogue” employee who committed the crime or if the culture of the corporation 
contributed to the offense. Baer, supra note 14, at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Sheley, supra note 8, at 8. 
 77. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement 
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORGS. 53, 55–56 & n.6 (1986). 
 78. Ramirez, supra note 49, at 965. 
 79. Brickey, supra note 7, at 9. 
 80. Fischel & Sykes, supra note 26, at 325–26. 
 81. Beale, supra note 30, at 1501–02. 
 82. Sheley, supra note 8, at 8. 
 83. Beale, supra note 30, at 1493. 
 84. Khanna, supra note 5, at 1491 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
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Domestically, the Model Penal Code (MPC), along with some states, 
only imposes liability on corporations based upon the actions of high-
level managers or the board of directors—and even then, only when 
they were acting on behalf of the corporation and within the scope of 
their employment.85 The MPC’s focus on high-level managers places an 
additional requirement upon the respondeat superior liability 
framework, with the idea that these managers’ actions would then 
represent the policy of the corporation.86 Yet three problems with the 
MPC formulation have been identified: (1) it is too broad because high-
level managers may still be acting on their own, (2) a corporate policy 
that results in a low-level employee’s committing a crime would not 
result in liability for the corporation, and (3) it gives high-level 
managers an incentive to remain unaware of criminal conduct.87 To 
correct these issues, Professor Bucy has argued that corporate culture 
should be taken into account and should give corporations a good faith 
defense to criminal conduct that may have been committed by one of 
their employees.88 Her position is that simple respondeat superior 
liability does not encourage law-abiding behavior and “fails to 
distinguish between those that are culpable and those that are not.”89 
Professor Bucy believes that corporate liability should rest on a 
corporate “ethos,” or corporate personality, and require that this ethos 
have encouraged the commission of the criminal act.90 She proposes 
using the past acts of the corporation to establish this ethos.91 Other 
commentators have gone so far as to argue that past conduct should 
result in increased penalties to the point of corporate death for repeat 
offenders.92  
Whatever one’s view of corporate criminal liability, it is unlikely to 
be eliminated, as can be surmised from the fact that no Attorney 
General in the last century has sought to narrow corporate criminal 
liability standards.93 Nonetheless, even among those who argue in favor 
of corporate criminal liability, there is a call for an increased 
requirement showing a “pervasive criminal intent throughout the 
corporate entity, in order to better justify finding the ‘corporate person’ 
collectively liable for criminal misconduct.”94 Similarly, on the 
                                                                                                                     
 85. Alschuler, supra note 6, at 1364. 
 86. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(4)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 87. See Bucy, Corporate Ethos, supra note 24, at 1104–05. 
 88. Bucy, Corporate Criminal Liability, supra note 33, at 1441–42. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Bucy, Corporate Ethos, supra note 24, at 1099.  
 91. Alschuler, supra note 6, at 1379 (citation omitted). 
 92. See, e.g., Ramirez, supra note 49, at 972–73. 
 93. Alschuler, supra note 6, at 1387. 
 94. Sheley, supra note 8, at 46. 
13
Wagner: Criminal Corporate Character
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
1306 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
opposing side, commentators who generally think corporate crime is a 
problematic issue agree that if liability is to be imposed, it should be 
upon those companies whose criminal conduct is genuinely “corporate” 
rather than individual in nature.95 Furthermore, most would agree that in 
the law, a paramount goal is that like actors should be treated alike and 
different actors should be treated differently.96 The question for the 
purposes of this Article is what does it mean for two corporations to be 
“alike?” To answer this question, we again need to step back and ask 
what our conception of a corporation is in the first place.   
C.  Corporations and Personhood 
It was pointed out almost a hundred years ago that juries are more 
likely to find corporations guilty than they are to find individuals guilty, 
and it is worthwhile to examine why.97 This state of affairs is unlikely to 
arise from corporations’ all being malevolent. As it happens, many early 
corporations were explicitly benevolent institutions, including several 
new church congregations.98 At their root, corporations exist because 
some endeavors require joint efforts and can only be achieved with 
many individuals participating. If the activities of large numbers of 
people are properly coordinated, the result can be far superior to the 
sum of what the individuals contributed.99 One of the challenges that 
have arisen as a result, however, has been to define this new collective 
entity and answer whether or not it is a “person.”  
There are at least three different ways that a corporation can be 
viewed as a person: a moral person, a natural person, and a legal 
person.100 A corporation clearly is not a natural person, clearly is a legal 
person, and arguably is a moral person that should be “held morally 
accountable for its actions.”101 At the same time, Justice John Paul 
Stevens has stated that “corporations have no consciences, no beliefs, 
no feelings, no thoughts, no desires. . . . [T]heir ‘personhood’ often 
serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are not themselves members of 
‘We the People’ by whom and for whom our Constitution was 
established.”102 In a similar vein, many assert that corporations cannot 
                                                                                                                     
 95. See, e.g., Fischel & Sykes, supra note 26, at 325. 
 96. Bucy, Corporate Ethos, supra note 24, at 1100 (citing H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF 
LAWS 155 (1961)). 
 97. See Edgerton, supra note 59, at 834–35. 
 98. See Goforth, supra note 13, at 625. 
 99. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247, 264 (1999). 
 100. Kim, supra note 48, at 784. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 972 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
14
Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss4/5
2013] CRIMINAL CORPORATE CHARACTER 1307 
 
decide, act, or intend on their own, and that these functions are simply 
accomplished through their human members, without whom it would 
have no identity or any ability to function.103 One possible criticism of 
this view of the corporation as an extension of the humans involved is 
the fact that a corporation can live for several generations without 
changing even if every human involved has changed.104 It would seem 
then that it cannot merely be an extension. 
Historically, it has been disputed whether the corporation is an entity 
beyond the people involved and its legal status.105 Chief Justice John 
Marshall described one view of corporations in Trustees of Dartmouth 
College v. Woodward: 106 “A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, 
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere 
creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of 
its creation confers upon it . . . .”107 Another view supported early on by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific 
Railroad Co.108 was that a corporation has rights and duties conferred 
upon it due to the rights and duties of its human members.109 Today, it 
is established that corporations are treated in many ways as though they 
were natural people. For example, they can own property, participate in 
binding legal contracts, can be sued in court (and in turn sue others), 
and can be prosecuted and held responsible for criminal actions.110 This 
does not mean, however, that they should always be treated the same as 
natural people. This Article argues that evidence law should draw a 
crucial distinction between individuals and corporations when it comes 
to how it treats character. 
II.  CORPORATE DECISION MAKING 
It is important here to first lay some groundwork on the nature of 
corporations and their functioning, beginning with corporate decision 
making. One problem in this area stems from the fact that corporate 
conduct is undertaken by people with different and possibly conflicting 
motivations, which can at times result in actions being taken that are not 
profit maximizing for the corporation.111 This is due in part to the fact 
                                                                                                                     
 103. See, e.g., Ripken, supra note 29, at 100. 
 104. PETER M. BLAU & W. RICHARD SCOTT, FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARATIVE 
APPROACH 1 (1962). 
 105. Ripken, supra note 29, at 100. 
 106. 17 U.S. 518 (1819). 
 107. Id. at 636. 
 108. 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
 109. Id. at 396 (citing oral arguments). 
 110. Brickey, supra note 7, at 2. 
 111. Gilchrist, supra note 11, at 36. 
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that people do not always follow economic considerations,112 but rather 
sometimes make decisions for various reasons ranging from legal 
obligations to self-interest to the maintenance of social relationships.113 
Even at the level of shareholders, who presumably have aligned general 
goals of making money, there can be a variance in areas like risk 
tolerance (possibly due to age and retirement considerations) or tax 
implications.114 Because people in a corporation hope to maximize their 
joint efforts, however, they are often willing to give up individual 
control and defer to an agreed-upon decision making hierarchy.115 
Consequently, shareholders have almost no power to make day-to-
day decisions in the corporations they own.116 The official power in a 
corporation resides with the board of directors.117 Further, most boards 
act in an advisory capacity and oversee the upper-level managers who 
typically run operations on a daily basis.118 Rather than describing a 
corporation as a group of individuals, it is more accurate to say that it is 
a hierarchy of teams, with a specific team—the board of directors—at 
the top.119 In most corporations, disagreements are raised to the next 
level of the hierarchy, with the ultimate arbitration ability residing with 
the board of directors.120 Major decisions in a corporation evolve 
through many different individuals who integrate their knowledge and 
individual decisions into the structure of the corporation.121 Given this, 
the decisions (and ultimately the character) of a corporation can be 
distinguished from those of any individual.122 The vast majority of 
decisions “are made collegially among team members at lower levels” 
of the corporation.123 Some commentators have argued that corporations 
may be more capable than humans of acting in a purposeful, rational, 
and calculating manner,124 and some studies have shown that groups 
make better decisions than the average individuals in the group and in 
fact make better decisions than the best individual in the group.125 
                                                                                                                     
 112. See Blair & Stout, supra note 99, at 315–19. 
 113. See id. 
 114. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Competing Concepts of the Corporation (a.k.a. Criteria? Just 
Say No), 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 77, 91 (2005). 
 115. See Blair & Stout, supra note 99, at 275–77. 
 116. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 4. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. at 8. 
 119. Id. at 2. 
 120. Blair & Stout, supra note 99, at 279. 
 121. HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING 
PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 221–22 (3d ed. 1976).  
 122. Id. at 221. 
 123. Blair & Stout, supra note 99, at 282. 
 124. See, e.g., Ripken, supra note 29, at 128. 
 125. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 12. But see David Schkade et al., Deliberating About 
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Under some circumstances, groups also make decisions faster than 
individuals.126 
Once we have established that, rather than individuals, it is a team or 
group making decisions, the next question of interest is how the group 
goes about doing so. In varied settings, corporations are likely to 
develop many different specific ways of making decisions.127 “One 
model of organizational decisionmaking views corporate 
decisionmaking as essentially a political bargaining process where 
several individuals or teams of individuals in the corporation may be 
involved in the making of a single business decision.”128 Therefore, 
given the complexities of this process, the final corporate action may 
not be the one that any specific person would have chosen 
individually.129 “All organizations must have some mechanism for 
aggregating the preferences of the organization’s constituencies and 
converting them into collective decisions.”130 One of the most 
prominent models of corporate decision making is the Corporation 
Internal Decision (CID) Structure.131 In this understanding, every 
corporation has a CID Structure:132 
CID Structures have two elements of interest to us here: 
(1) an organizational or responsibility flow chart that 
delineates stations and levels within the corporate power 
structure and (2) corporate decision recognition rule(s) 
(usually embedded in something called “corporation 
policy”). The CID Structure is the personnel organization 
for the exercise of the corporation’s power with respect to 
its ventures, and as such its primary function is to draw 
experience from various levels of the corporation into a 
decision-making and ratification process.133 
The CID Structure allows information and positions developed by 
human individuals to be synthesized and turned into a decision by the 
                                                                                                                     
Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139, 1141 (2000) (describing the potentially 
distorting effect of group polarization on jury decisions in tort law). For a discussion of the 
literature on the individual decision making of judges versus the group decision making of 
juries, see generally Irina D. Manta, Reasonable Copyright, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1303 (2012). 
 126. See Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 12–14 & nn.46–47. 
 127. See Metzger & Dalton, supra note 75, at 551–52. 
 128. Kim, supra note 48, at 789 (citation omitted). 
 129. Id. at 790. 
 130. Bainbridge, supra note 114, at 90.  
 131. See Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207, 211 
(1979). 
 132. See id. at 212. 
 133. Id. 
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corporate entity, permitting different inputs and perspectives to come 
together for a common goal.134 The goals of corporations and 
individuals are often similar, and to the extent there is a difference, it 
tends to arise from the aims of corporations being more stable and less 
varied than those of individuals.135 “The collective nature of the 
corporation’s decision-making system transforms the individual inputs, 
making the individual intentions and actions unrecognizable when the 
final corporate intention is formulated.”136 Given the CID Structure, 
corporate decision making must be more transparent than individual 
thoughts or choices because communication between many different 
entities has to occur before a corporate decision can be reached.  
III.  CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
A.  The Nature of Character Evidence 
“For at least two centuries, both English and American courts have 
generally prohibited the use of character evidence as circumstantial 
proof that a person engaged in a particular conduct . . . .”137 Here, I will 
briefly delineate the common understandings of “character” and what 
evidence is allowed versus what evidence is prohibited. According to 
Professors Christopher Mueller and Laird Kirkpatrick, “‘character’ 
means a person’s disposition or propensity to engage or not engage in 
various forms of conduct.”138 Character evidence has also been 
described as information, not about a fact currently at issue in the 
litigation, but rather about the person’s or entity’s past conduct.139 Other 
related definitions of character are “a human being’s propensity to 
engage in a general type of conduct”140 and an “internal operating 
system” that influences a person’s behavior.141 This could be seen as 
very similar to a CID Structure in corporations.142 As applied in 
evidence law, “character” has also been described as “a collection of 
‘traits,’ each a self-contained packet of potential conduct consistent with 
                                                                                                                     
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 214. 
 136. Ripken, supra note 29, at 127. 
 137. David P. Leonard, In Defense of the Character Evidence Prohibition: Foundations of 
the Rule Against Trial by Character, 73 IND. L.J. 1161, 1164–65 (1998). 
 138. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 182 (4th ed. 2009). 
 139. Chris Chambers Goodman, The Gate(way)s of Hell and Pathways to Purgatory: 
Eradicating Common Law Protections in the Newly Sculpted Character Evidence Rules of the 
United Kingdom’s 2003 Criminal Justice Act, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 82 (2011). 
 140. Richard C. Wydick, Character Evidence: A Guided Tour of the Grotesque Structure, 
21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 123, 124 (1987). 
 141. Peter Tillers, What Is Wrong with Character Evidence?, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 781, 782 
(1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 142. See supra Part II. 
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previously observed reactions to events, people, or things.”143 Or 
character could simply be defined as a collection of traits and 
dispositions.144 Even though the exact definition of character may be 
elusive, we do have a sense of the concept, which boils down to a 
general impression of what a person is like. This brings us to the matter 
of what evidence law prohibits in this regard. 
Rules limiting the use of character evidence exist in virtually every 
jurisdiction in the United States.145 Federal Rule of Evidence 404 states: 
“Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not 
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on 
a particular occasion . . . .”146 This rule is read in conjunction with 
Rule 405, which establishes three types of character evidence one can 
introduce at times: (1) testimony about a person’s reputation in the 
community for a specific character trait, (2) a witness’s opinion about a 
character trait, and (3) specific instances of conduct that demonstrate the 
person’s character.147 Evidence prohibited for seeking to prove action in 
conformity with a certain character may be admissible under a different 
theory,148 for example, to show that the person had the necessary 
knowledge or required intent.149 When admitted for some other purpose, 
however, it is subject to objection, increased appellate scrutiny, and 
limited use in argument. An example of the character evidence rule in 
practice would be the prosecution in an aggravated battery case wanting 
to introduce evidence that the defendant has previously shown his 
violent character and has on more than one occasion seriously injured 
other people. The prosecution wants to argue that because of this 
history, the defendant is more likely to have committed the battery in 
the case at bar. The rules of evidence would, however, generally 
prohibit this.150 
Other countries have greatly relaxed the prohibition on character 
evidence,151 and since the Federal Rules of Evidence were passed in 
                                                                                                                     
 143. H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and 
Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 849 (1982) (citation omitted). 
 144. See Tillers, supra note 141, at 783. 
 145. See Sherry F. Colb, “Whodunit” Versus “What Was Done”: When to Admit Character 
Evidence in Criminal Cases, 79 N.C. L. REV 939, 941 & n.7 (2001). 
 146. FED. R. EVID. 404(a). 
 147. Kim, supra note 48, at 768.  
 148. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged 
Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character 
Evidence Prohibition, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 575, 575 (1990); FED R. EVID. 404(b).  
 149. Kim, supra note 48, at 810.  
 150. See FED. R. EVID. 404. 
 151. See, e.g., Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence, supra note 148, at 602 & n.187 
(identifying the United Kingdom as one example). 
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1975, Congress has significantly amended them several times.152 The 
most important amendment dealing with character evidence was in 
1994, when Congress changed the rules to allow character evidence in 
cases dealing with sexual misconduct or child molestation.153 
Specifically, Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415 allow the use 
of character evidence to show action in conformity with that character 
in cases involving sexual assault or child molestation.154 Character 
evidence is also used at various specific times in criminal proceedings 
for sentencing and determining punitive damages.155 In fact, specific 
instances of past misconduct are used in various ways and at different 
times throughout a trial, perhaps most importantly to determine the 
severity of the penalty. In federal court, the rules of evidence (including 
those on character evidence) are specifically not applicable during 
sentencing,156 and the well-known “three strikes” laws drastically 
increase a defendant’s potential punishment based entirely upon his past 
conduct.157 
It has been claimed that “[t]he admissibility of uncharged 
misconduct evidence is the single most important issue in contemporary 
criminal evidence law.”158 In some jurisdictions, improper admission of 
uncharged misconduct is the most common ground for appeals and the 
most frequent ground for reversals.159 Given that uncharged misconduct 
is possibly the most contentious of the character evidence rules, it is 
helpful to examine what has led to the exclusion of this kind of 
information. 
B.  Arguments Against Admitting Character Evidence 
“[C]haracter evidence is often very probative.”160 There is a risk, 
however, that juries will give character evidence more weight than it 
deserves.161 On the other hand, some scholars have gone as far as 
                                                                                                                     
 152. Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 COLUM L. 
REV. 1227, 1231–32 n.4 (2001). 
 153. Leonard, supra note 137, at 1162.  
 154. FED. R. EVID. 413 (sexual assault); FED. R. EVID. 414 (child molestation); FED. R. 
EVID. 415 (both). 
 155. Sanchirico, supra note 152, at 1233. 
 156. See id. at 1268 (noting that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines only consider a 
defendant’s criminal history category and offense characteristics). 
 157. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (2006); 
CAL. PENAL. CODE § 1170.12 (Deering 2013) (outlining California’s Three Strikes Law). 
 158. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence, supra note 148, at 576 (citation omitted).  
 159. Id. at 577. 
 160. Tillers, supra note 141, at 792.  
 161. Id. 
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arguing that the probative value of character evidence is actually low.162 
Given the very low standard necessary for evidence to be considered 
relevant enough to be admitted,163 that alone would likely not be a 
sufficient bar even if true.164 The starting point for judging the validity 
of this prohibition is the idea that it is fundamental to American 
jurisprudence “that a defendant must be tried for what he did, not for 
who he is.”165 In Michelson v. United States,166 the U.S. Supreme Court 
pointed out that the rule against character evidence is based upon the 
fact that in our system, a man cannot be convicted and sent to prison 
simply because he is “a bad man.”167 Similarly, an old principle in 
American courts is that “a person should not be judged strenuously by 
reference to the awesome spectre of his past life.”168 This basic 
objection to admitting character evidence is only the beginning.  
There are several more specific justifications for the ban on character 
evidence.169 One commonly mentioned reason is that jurors will 
overvalue character evidence and jump to an incorrect conclusion about 
the specific charge once they learn that the defendant has committed 
other bad acts.170 A good example of this justification is the often 
repeated saying “[o]nce a thief, always a thief.”171 As mentioned, the 
fear is that “jurors might give character evidence undeserved weight,”172  
particularly giving too much weight to dispositions or personality traits 
and not enough weight to specific situational factors.173 The danger is 
potentially even greater when the defendant was accused but not 
convicted of a previous crime, since the jury may feel that the defendant 
should be punished for not only the current but also past offenses.174 
This exacerbates the possibility that a juror will decide that the 
defendant deserves punishment because he is a bad person as opposed 
                                                                                                                     
 162. Id. at 783 (citation omitted). 
 163. See FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 164. Tillers, supra note 141, at 783. 
 165. United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 166. 335 U.S. 469 (1948). 
 167. Id. at 489 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
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to because he committed the current offense.175  
Also, with character evidence, a previous defendant may be 
investigated and charged because the police knew about his initial 
crime, which the jury may not realize.176 Therefore, the jury is left with 
the impression that it is very unlikely that a man would be randomly 
suspected of a crime by the police when a year ago, he had committed 
the exact same crime.177 Jurors would ask themselves: “If this were a 
mistake and this person had not committed this crime, what are the odds 
that he would be prosecuted for it and coincidentally had, in fact, 
committed the very same crime a year previously?” Logically, they may 
conclude that such a result is outside the realm of probability. Rather, 
they would think that this only makes sense because it is not a mistake 
and this person is being charged now and was convicted then because 
he repeatedly does the same thing. Yet, this entire train of thought may 
be erroneous because the police, knowing about the previous crime, 
may have used that information to suspect him in the first place. The 
answer to the question of probability is, therefore, that the odds of this 
happening are very high! 
Another series of objections to using character evidence comes from 
the notion that character evidence is only probative “if we assume that 
character traits are relatively stable and that people generally act in 
conformity” with those traits.178 The prevalent consensus used to be that 
people have character traits that remain fairly consistent.179 Some 
psychologists, however, have questioned the stability of personality 
traits due to the lack of empirical evidence to support their existence.180 
Hence, psychologists began to doubt the personality trait theory and 
developed the belief that behavior is much more dependent on specific 
situational circumstances.181 If true, the criticisms of the idea that 
personality traits are stable would be a strong reason for questioning the 
relevance of character evidence for individuals, particularly given most 
jurors’ strong instinctual reaction to such evidence.182 When the Federal 
Rules of Evidence were being drafted, the then-relatively new theory 
now called “situationism,” which viewed environmental factors as the 
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major determinants of a person’s conduct, predominated.183 That theory 
posited that one problem with the reliability of personality traits is the 
seemingly tiny amount of situational difference that can cause a person 
to act in disparate ways.184 Given the near impossibility of observing the 
decision making process and the number of variables in the human 
decision making process, situationism argued that it is difficult to 
develop an accurate or predictive character profile.185 These arguments 
helped shape the rules of evidence that we see today. 
Courts also exclude this type of evidence due to its complicating 
effect and the potential for jury confusion.186 Judicial efficiency is 
another argument against character evidence, in that allowing it could 
cause a court to get unnecessarily entangled in the specifics of the 
parties’ past lives.187 If character evidence were allowed generally, 
some argue that “trials would turn into contests about which party has 
the better charitable record.”188 Nonetheless, some of these concerns are 
not very forceful due to the fact that the court still has the ability to limit 
evidence under the general rules related to prejudice and probative 
value.189 Not only are there several objections to the admission of 
character evidence generally, but some individuals have attacked the 
rules allowing character evidence in sexual assault and child 
molestation cases on the grounds that there is no real distinction 
between those defendants and other potential defendants that would 
justify unequal treatment.190 
C.  Arguments for Admitting Character Evidence 
Arguments for banning character evidence notwithstanding, there are 
many reasons that support allowing it. First, one of the foundational 
goals of evidence law is accuracy,191 because its lack could result in 
great inefficiency, massive costs on parties and society, the undermining 
of notice and participation, unpredictability, failures to guide and deter 
conduct, violations of substantive rights, and the risk of political 
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illegitimacy.192 The two fundamental tenets of evidence law are that we 
should exclude irrelevant evidence and admit relevant evidence unless 
there is a good reason to exclude it.193 Even the courts on rare occasion 
express disdain for character evidence rules and acknowledge the 
relevance of the excluded information.194 “[T]he logical relevance of 
uncharged misconduct is . . . undeniable.”195 Everybody uses character-
based reasoning daily.196 When someone decides whom to trust to fix 
his car, watch his children, or invest his money, what information does 
he want to know? Presumably, he would like to find out what happened 
the last time a given individual performed these activities. The 
popularity of review websites in which the main purpose is to see how a 
particular business performed in the past adds more weight to the 
contention that as a society, we value knowledge about past behavior 
and use it as a future predictor.197 Hence, when it comes to everyday 
life, we very much tend to see the past as relevant.  
In that sense, an increased use of character evidence would allow 
jurors to use their common sense in determining what information is 
useful to arrive at their verdicts.198 Wholly relying on character 
evidence would be inappropriate,199 but that does not alter the fact that it 
does sometimes change the equation and make the possibility that 
someone committed an act more or less likely.200 Evidence can be 
incomplete, inaccurate, or both. At the same time, “by gathering and 
putting together enough evidentiary traces, ambiguities can be canceled, 
distortions can be revealed and discounted, and a fair similitude of the 
past event can be achieved.”201 Relatedly, some of the psychological 
theories that were relied upon when the Federal Rules of Evidence were 
drafted are no longer as trusted. Recent psychological theories have 
suggested that a combination of traits and specific aspects of situations 
can lead to predictable conduct.202 Today, many psychologists agree 
                                                                                                                     
 192. Id. 
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that people do have cross-situational attributes that, when combined 
with factors in specific situations, help determine what a person will 
do.203 In essence, the rules regarding the exclusion of character evidence 
are at least in part based upon “questionable assumptions about human 
nature.”204 
There are three additional reasons to allow character evidence. First, 
allowing character evidence would increase the disincentives of 
recidivists, because they would know that they have an increased 
likelihood of conviction due to the admission of prior misconduct 
evidence.205 The second additional argument is that, as has been noted 
by the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the problem of surprise 
(and many of the other objections to character evidence) could be dealt 
with both via notice requirements and the general rule that evidence can 
be excluded if it would create “unfair prejudice.”206 The third argument, 
which has been endorsed by some courts, is the low likelihood that an 
innocent individual will be charged with a crime when he had 
coincidentally committed the same crime months or years ago, and that 
this increases the appropriateness of admitting the past evidence.207 
Nonetheless, as mentioned above,208 this may ignore the possibility that 
the past act was why the defendant was suspected and charged in the 
first place.  
Due to these arguments, many scholars have recommended allowing 
the limited use of character evidence because they hope to maximize the 
amount of probative evidence and minimize unfair prejudice.209 
Professor Richard Uviller may have said it best over thirty years ago: 
Predisposition, so long a pariah in the law of evidence, 
must be reclaimed from the shadows. Its inference has been 
persistent and ineradicable because our common experience 
informs us that evidence of predisposition is probative. But 
our Victorian sensibilities have demanded denial, and so 
the influence of the banished force has been devious and 
distorted. If we hope to achieve rules that make sense, and 
if we hope to write rules to enhance the accuracy of the 
fact-finding process, we should abandon our frayed 
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pretense concerning the value of character evidence.210 
Clinging to these Victorian sensibilities involves an elevated possibility 
of creating distortion when they are applied to a criminal concept not in 
effect until after that era. 
D.  Applying Character Evidence Rules to Corporations 
It is currently unclear whether a corporation’s past misconduct can 
be admitted to show the corporation’s bad character and that it acted in 
conformity with that character on a specific occasion.211 Most courts 
simply assume that Rule 404 applies to corporations without analyzing 
the merits of that position.212 Several courts in various settings have 
extended the character evidence ban to corporations and other groups. 
For example, when one court barred potential character evidence from 
being used against a nonhuman entity (in this case, a union), it stated: 
“[E]vidence of a trait of a person’s character with respect to care or skill 
is inadmissible to prove the quality of his conduct on a specified 
occasion.”213 The court never discussed the fact that it was applying the 
rule to an organization rather than a person. Another example of a court 
excluding character evidence in this context can be seen in American 
National Watermattress Corp. v. Manville,214 where the Alaska 
Supreme Court applied the character evidence prohibition to a 
corporation even though the corporation’s counsel had not specifically 
requested this.215 
In federal court, questions stem in part from the facts that the Federal 
Rules of Evidence do not define person and that the term is used in an 
inconsistent manner.216 Some courts have stated that a corporation has 
no character,217 and there is no consensus on behalf of courts, 
commentators, or legislators as to whether the character evidence rules 
should apply to corporations.218 One thing that does seem clear is that 
prior-act evidence can be used against a corporation in cases that 
involve sexual assault by an employee.219 Yet this has little to do with 
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the status of the corporation and is based rather on the application of the 
amended evidence rules regarding sexual assault.220 The next question 
this Article addresses is whether the character evidence rules should be 
amended to reflect the differences between corporations and 
individuals. As one scholar has pointed out: “When a rule of exclusion 
flies in the face of common sense and is based on dubious 
generalizations about the danger of misdecision, it does not take much 
to justify an exception that will let the trier hear more of the relevant 
data.”221 I will explore how this idea applies in the case of corporations. 
E.  General Proposals to Change the Rules 
Before embarking on a discussion of whether the rules barring 
character evidence should be changed, I should first acknowledge that 
the bar is already not absolute and in fact has been changed relatively 
recently. Character evidence is often used in trials in both appropriate 
and inappropriate (but unobjected to) ways.222 For example, allowing a 
defendant to put on evidence that he has a character or character trait 
that is inconsistent with having committed the charged offense is a true 
exception to the idea that conduct cannot be proved by character.223 The 
defense can use character evidence in part because this carries a reduced 
danger of prejudice to the defendant and now the probative value224 is 
more likely to outweigh its cost.225 Furthermore, even though the 
concerns about unfair prejudice and misdecision are prominent 
objections to character evidence,226 and even though this risk is highest 
when the offense is reprehensible,227 Congress has already changed the 
character laws in regard to rape and child molestation—considered two 
of the most heinous crimes, according to at least one study.228 
                                                                                                                     
corporate sexual misconduct would be to emasculate the force of Rule 415.”). 
 220. See FED. R. EVID. 415(a). 
 221. Park, supra note 176, at 272. 
 222. Samuel R. Gross, Make-Believe: The Rules Excluding Evidence of Character and 
Liability Insurance, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 851–54 (1998). 
 223. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1); United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1075–76 (7th 
Cir. 1977) (overruled on other grounds). 
 224. How probative a piece of evidence is means how effective the evidence is in proving 
some disputed fact. Pardo, supra note 191, at 14–15. 
 225. Wydick, supra note 140, at 142. 
 226. See supra Section III.B. 
 227. See William Roth, Understanding Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts: A Diagrammatic 
Approach, 9 PEPP. L. REV. 297, 300 n.9 (1982). 
 228. Imwinkelried, Undertaking the Task, supra note 195, at 297 & n.75 (citing Sin: From 
Murder to Laziness and Cutting in Line, a Darn-Close-to-Scientific Poll Ranks the Wrongs That 
Flesh is Heir To, PEOPLE, Feb. 10, 1986, at 106, 108, available at http://www.people.com/peopl 
e/archive/article/0,,20092922,00.html). 
27
Wagner: Criminal Corporate Character
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
1320 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
 
Given these exceptions to the character evidence rules, the criteria 
for the prohibition seem to involve balancing. Hence, the main question 
in any particular situation is whether the benefits of excluding this type 
of evidence outweigh the costs.229 Part of this determination must also 
take into account that while evidence law is often focused on what 
many consider to be the main purpose of trials (that is, fact-finding), 
another purpose of trials can be the provision of incentives.230 As other 
scholars have pointed out, if character evidence is actually more reliable 
than has been historically assumed, it may be appropriate to lift the per 
se ban and allow judges to make a case-by-case analysis.231 
Notwithstanding the existence of relatively recent changes to the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, such rules can be difficult to modify. 
Indeed, rules of evidence can “survive even when there is no good 
reason for their continued existence.”232 The advisory committee on the 
rules of evidence, when referring to the rules regarding character, once 
admitted that they “lie[] more in history and experience than in 
logic.”233 This is particularly troublesome when much has changed 
since the time when the rules were enacted. Professor David Leonard 
has pointed out that “[w]hen a rule’s longevity can be measured in 
terms of centuries rather than only years or decades, it is particularly 
appropriate to undertake reform cautiously. The character rule presents 
such an instance.”234 However accurate this warning may be generally, 
it carries less weight when the rule under consideration is being applied 
in a completely new manner. Corporations did not exist in their current 
form centuries ago and there was no criminal liability imposed upon 
them when the rule was constructed. Therefore, we should not feel 
bound by the pedigree of the rule in this context and should rather 
evaluate it neutrally on its own merits. Using the balancing criteria 
mentioned above, I argue that the rule should be changed when applied 
to corporations. 
IV.  CHARACTER EVIDENCE AS APPLIED TO CORPORATIONS 
This Part shows that the term “person” in Federal Rule of Evidence 
404 (and its state corollaries) should be understood not to include 
corporations. Originally, the U.S. Supreme Court established in 1819 
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that a corporation was a “mere creature of law” that owed its existence 
to government and hence only had the rights and privileges that the 
government granted to it.235 If that were still the prominent view, there 
would not be as much uncertainty about the situation. The argument 
would likely go that only those rights specifically given to corporations 
by the government are the ones it possesses, and that because the 
protection of the character evidence ban was not specifically extended 
to corporations, it should not apply to them. Over the course of the last 
century, however, corporations have been given many constitutionally 
protected rights236 and have also been treated as persons in other 
contexts. I argue that when it comes to character evidence rules, they 
should not be viewed as such. The reasons are consistent with the aims 
of corporate criminal law and evidence law, including both the search 
for truth and the desire to establish an optimal incentives structure. 
I will begin by describing how the rules apply to an individual and 
then how definitively lifting the prohibition for corporations specifically 
would affect the prosecution of a corporation in the same circumstance. 
The rules currently forbid using the fact that a defendant—say, a car 
salesman—has a record of falsely representing the condition of the cars 
he sells to establish that he is the kind of person who would 
intentionally misrepresent the condition of a car and, hence, did so on a 
particular occasion.237 Suppose instead that CarMax, the large used-car 
resale corporation, had an unwritten de facto policy requiring its 
salespeople to consistently hide the defects in a car and, after fixing the 
odometer, the employees indeed lied about the number of miles a car 
had been driven.238 I argue that evidence about CarMax’s past actions of 
deception should be allowed in a new prosecution for fraud. In addition 
to this hypothetical example, there are many real-world examples in 
which the character of a corporation should be used. For example, in 
May of 2010, for the fourth time in less than a year, Johnson & Johnson 
recalled 136 million bottles of children’s medicine, prompting the 
government to accuse them of “systemic failures and a culture of 
mediocrity.”239 In a prosecution for something like negligent homicide, 
the prosecution should be able to argue that defendants were negligent 
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in the past and that it is therefore more likely that they were negligent 
this time. Another good example concerns Massey Energy: 
Massey Energy provides the stark example of a company 
culture directly contributing to the death of twenty-nine 
men. On April 5, 2010, “a powerful explosion tore through 
the Upper Big Branch mine, owned by Massey Energy.” 
The explosion killed twenty-nine miners and left one 
seriously injured. A spark from a mining tool ignited a 
pocket of methane, and the exploding methane eventually 
ignited coal dust. The explosion traveled through more than 
two miles of mine. An independent commission conducted 
extensive analysis and investigation before concluding that 
the explosion was caused by extensive safety violations and 
was “a completely predictable result for a company that 
ignored basic safety standards and put too much faith in its 
own mythology.” The safety lapses were so extensive that 
the commission concludes they could “only be explained in 
the context of a culture in which wrongdoing became 
acceptable, where deviation became the 
norm.” . . . . Methane gas, coal dust and a spark caused the 
explosion; the culture of Massey Energy caused the 
presence of methane gas, coal dust and a spark.240 
In a prosecution for this explosion or a subsequent incident, the jury 
should be able to evaluate the evidence of past actions and determine its 
significance on whether the company behaved in a similar manner. As 
has been pointed out by other scholars, “[t]he corporation should be 
held accountable under the criminal law if the corporation, by 
establishing organizational cultures that tacitly countenance crime, is 
the real party-in-interest rather than the so-called ‘bad apple.’”241 
Character evidence may be quite useful in determining if the 
corporation has established this type of culture, potentially making the 
evidence very probative. For several decades, scholars have called for 
the introduction of character evidence when it is more probative than 
prejudicial.242 I claim that in corporate settings, it is in fact generally 
more probative than prejudicial for reasons ranging from the reliability 
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of the evidence due to the corporate structure, to the historical oddity 
that resulted in the initial ban, to the increased ability of the corporation 
to defend itself, and to corporations’ intentional development of their 
character. As to this last point, “modern corporations develop distinctive 
personae through increasingly sophisticated marketing techniques.”243 
They specifically do so to maximize profits; therefore, it is more 
appropriate to hold them accountable for all aspects of that character 
given that changing the incentives could greatly affect how they act 
subsequently. Defense lawyers also know about and use a corporation’s 
character and image in litigation when attempting to project a positive 
image of the corporation,244 which gives courts greater justification to 
hold them accountable for it.  
Historically, early courts rooted the prohibition against character 
evidence in the “jealous regard for the liberty of the individual.”245 
These circumstances are very different when there is no individual and 
“liberty” is not in question.246 Further, as pointed out previously, the 
rules regarding character evidence are at least in part based upon shaky 
understandings of human nature,247 making them inapplicable to 
corporations even absent the shakiness.  
While rules of evidence have been changed at least in part due to the 
status of the victim,248 the status of the defendant should also be a 
relevant consideration. Evidence rules and procedures were not only 
constructed originally for individuals,249 but it is also true that “false 
convictions of corporations are not as problematic to society as false 
convictions of individuals.”250 Furthermore, “[t]he unique difficulties 
associated with detecting, investigating, and proving corporate 
criminality suggest . . . that the number of false corporate convictions is 
already very low.”251 Not only is that the case, but one must also 
consider the magnitude of the risk of recidivism. As mentioned, since 
1995, the Federal Rules of Evidence have allowed character evidence to 
prove action in conformity therewith in sexual assault cases and child 
molestation cases, including civil cases.252 This use of character 
evidence was in part justified by the indications of high levels of 
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recidivism from such perpetrators.253 Researchers have noticed a 
similarly high level of consistency in corporate behavior, meaning that 
corporations tend to act either ethically or dubiously on a regular 
basis,254 and often commit the same or very similar offenses repeatedly. 
Some scholars have even argued for applying a “three strikes” rule to 
corporations in an attempt to address recidivism.255 Therefore, the same 
justification that was used to admit character evidence in sexual assault 
cases can be used to admit it in corporate criminal cases, and in fact the 
argument to do so is potentially stronger in the corporate setting.  
As pointed out previously, some have attacked the rules allowing 
character evidence in sexual assault and child molestation cases on the 
grounds that there is “no principled distinction” between those 
defendants and other potential defendants that would justify disparate 
treatment.256 My proposal does not face this obstacle because there are 
significant differences between corporations and individuals, including 
when it comes to general recidivism rates, potential consequences they 
could each encounter outside the criminal law, the different penalties 
that individuals face, corporations’ increased ability to defend 
themselves, and the different decision making processes they each 
experience. Furthermore, the likelihood of unfair prejudice is much 
higher in sexual crimes—particularly in child-molestation cases—than 
it is in virtually any corporate crime. At least one study has confirmed 
what most people would assume: nonviolent theft offenses are usually 
viewed as much less heinous than crimes such as murder or rape.257 
These results have led at least one scholar to recommend that theft 
offenses would make a good candidate to begin changing the character 
evidence rules.258 My proposal not only limits the change primarily to 
nonviolent, non-heinous types of crimes,259 but also distinguishes 
between significantly different defendants. 
Another argument for allowing corporate character evidence to 
prove action in conformity with that character is based on continuity, 
which refers to the fact that character evidence is used both before and 
after the guilt phase of a trial. Corporate criminal liability is so broad 
that prosecutors must pick and choose from many companies that 
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technically qualify for prosecution.260 Attorney General Eric Holder’s 
memorandum giving guidance for prosecutors in corporate matters 
contained nine factors that should be considered when determining 
whether to prosecute, including “the corporation’s history of similar 
conduct.”261 Past acts or behavior, therefore, must come into play, and 
the same evidence that is kept from the jury through character evidence 
rules is used to determine if the case even goes to the jury. On the other 
side of the trial, sentencing guidelines indicate that an important factor 
to consider is the corporate ethos and whether it supports a corporate 
culture that encourages compliance with the law.262 This type of 
information is also supplied by character evidence. Thus, courts are 
directed to view the very same information they are denied during the 
guilt phases of a trial to determine the appropriate punishment during 
the sentencing phase. It seems logical that the evidence that is required 
to be considered both before and after a trial be available for 
consideration during a trial.  
Another ground for allowing character evidence revolves around the 
idea of fairness. A possible argument for disallowing corporate 
character evidence is that it may not be fair to the corporation or its 
shareholders. One reason this may be viewed as unfair, as discussed in 
cases dating back to 1684 that have excluded character evidence, has 
been the possibility of unfair surprise.263 Their institutional memory and 
legal assistance, however, would allow corporations to anticipate the 
use of this evidence. Unlike an individual who may have no idea that 
his past acts could be used against him in court,264 a corporation would 
likely have experienced enough trial or court proceedings to be aware of 
the possibility. Further, their attorneys would obviously know and point 
out this possibility. 
Introducing character evidence may also not be fair to shareholders. 
While it remains an open question whether having criminal liability for 
corporations at all is fair to shareholders, if we set that aside and ask 
only whether the character evidence rules themselves are fair to those 
actors, the answer seems to be yes. One could argue that the key to 
fairness to the investors is whether information regarding the risks and 
                                                                                                                     
 260. See Baer, supra note 14, at 3.  
 261. Sheley, supra note 8, at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Memorandum 
from the Deputy Attorney General to All Component Heads and United States Attorneys (June 
16, 1999), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/charging-
corps.PDF). 
 262. See Sheyn, supra note 45, at 15.  
 263. Leonard, supra note 137, at 1185. 
 264. One suspects, however, that most people with no knowledge of evidence law would 
assume that their past acts could be used. 
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rewards possible from an investment in Corporation X is known at the 
time of investment.265 With this rule change, the risks will be known 
since all past acts will be assumed to be admissible evidence in future 
prosecutions and hence raise the likelihood of conviction and lower the 
appropriate stock price. Therefore, even though it may have a negative 
impact on stock prices and potentially cost the corporation money, it 
would still be fair to the shareholders. One last point in relation to 
fairness is that if bad character evidence is admissible, the corporation 
would, of course, have the opportunity to introduce evidence of good 
corporate character that may negate more unfortunate implications.266 
Another problem mentioned above in the context of general 
objections to character evidence, namely the misleading “coincidence” 
factor,267 also has reduced impact on corporations. In the case of a 
corporation, a known environmental polluter may become a suspect if a 
new pollutant is discovered in a nearby waterway. Yet the danger is not 
as great as for individuals for several reasons. First, the corporation is 
likely much more capable of presenting to the jury the fact that it was 
investigated because of the prior incident and therefore there was no 
coincidence. Second, a corporation has an increased ability to 
investigate the incident itself and present alternative suspects much 
more readily than an individual. Finally, it is possible that this potential 
problem could be viewed as a benefit in that it will prompt corporations 
to set a premium on avoiding the first incident of criminal behavior. 
This may or may not be advantageous given the possibility of 
overdeterrence,268 but it is certainly more advantageous than for an 
individual.  
The distinctions between individuals and corporations argue in favor 
of admitting character evidence in more ways than one, including as 
related to the concept of personality traits itself. As pointed out above, 
one problem with the idea of personality traits is the seemingly tiny 
amount of situational difference that can cause variation in a person’s 
behavior.269 This problem is mitigated with corporations due to the 
nature of the CID Structure.270 Because information has to be shared 
before decisions are made, but not every minute detail is transmitted in 
                                                                                                                     
 265. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 
1268 (1982). 
 266. See, e.g., Norwest Bank N.M., N.A. v. Chrysler Corp., 981 P.2d 1215, 1226 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1999) (affirming the admission of evidence by Chrysler to “rebut[] Plaintiff’s evidence of 
Chrysler’s bad corporate character”). 
 267. See supra Section III.B; Park, supra note 176, at 273. 
 268. Here overdeterrence means, for example, the possibility that a corporation will spend 
$100 to avoid a violation that would have resulted in $50 worth of damage.  
 269. See supra Section III.B; Méndez, The Law of Evidence, supra note 169, at 228. 
 270. See supra Part III. 
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this process, corporations as entities cannot be aware of the same level 
of situational detail of which a person may be aware and that may affect 
her. Small situational differences would thus never gain significance, 
would not cause a change in corporate behavior, and would lead to more 
predictability. A person, however, may be motivated to change his 
behavior by something so small that he would not even be aware of it. 
For example, a man with a violent disposition may not assault another 
individual because the latter reminded him of his son in some way that 
the man did not even recognize. A corporation is not capable of 
distinctions like that due to the fact that for corporate action, the 
information is synthesized through several people. This requires 
presentation of the information and hence cannot go unnoticed or 
remain subconscious.  
In the same vein, when considering the harm caused, one must take 
into account the fact that the size of many corporations and their 
potentially widespread misconduct may contribute to increased harm 
when compared with the discrete actions of individual actors.271 
Different actions taken in remote locations can combine to result in 
more harmful consequences than the individual actions would seem to 
indicate.272 This supports my argument that the rule should be changed 
because it would be far more difficult, if not impossible, to use 
information of distant acts by the corporation in the current case without 
changing the rules of evidence. As pointed out previously, it may be 
possible to introduce this evidence on a different basis, but this is far 
from clear and may result in a large amount of uncertainty and 
increased appellate costs.  
A final distinguishing feature of a large corporation is the fact that it 
can survive for many generations, which is often referred to as its 
“permanence.”273 A corporation’s permanence is another reason the rule 
against character evidence should not apply to it due to the increased 
potential harm. The fact that a corporation may be around for several 
generations increases society’s need to ensure that it complies with legal 
requirements. If it is aware that crimes it commits today could be used 
against it in the future, there is an increased incentive to avoid not only 
future crimes but the initial crime as well. Compounding the differences 
I have discussed between corporations and individuals is that society is 
unlikely to look kindly upon lenient treatment for corporations, and the 
legal system risks its legitimacy when the public loses faith in it. 
Erroneous fact-finding may affect not only the parties to the trial but 
also the public at large in that society could lose “confidence in the 
                                                                                                                     
 271. Sheley, supra note 8, at 35. 
 272. See supra notes 240–41 and accompanying text (discussing the Massey Energy case).  
 273. Kim, supra note 48, at 788. 
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civil- and criminal-justice systems, creating a very real risk of 
disorder.”274 People can become less trusting, however, both if too 
much and if too little evidence is allowed before the jury, because either 
circumstance has the potential to affect the judicial search for truth. 
Jurors themselves may feel deceived if after they acquit a corporation in 
a close case they find out that the corporation has been convicted of the 
same crime several times before.  
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that a corporation should not be considered a “person” 
when it comes to the prohibition on introducing a person’s character to 
show that he acted in conformity with it. Lawyers should argue that the 
rule does not apply, judges should concur with this argument, and 
legislators should perhaps amend the rules for the sake of clarification. I 
have pointed out that it is possible that past acts are more reliable 
indicators for corporations than they are for people. There is also a 
lowered cost of error in admitting that evidence, because corporations 
do not face incarceration. They also have an increased ability to show 
rehabilitation (in that a change in policy would be documented with a 
corporation, but not with a person). Furthermore, corporations are 
typically better represented in court.  
In the past, applying character evidence rules to corporations has 
faced some opposition because principles of human autonomy and 
respect militate for limiting them to individuals,275 but this Article has 
added to the discourse by illuminating the relationship between 
character rules and the general purposes of corporate criminal law and 
evidence law. As I pointed out, one of the primary goals of criminal law 
is deterrence. Using character evidence for corporations more 
effectively achieves this goal. Not only does it make conviction more 
likely for corporations that have previously committed crimes—thereby 
encouraging them to avoid possible criminal conduct from now on—it 
also leads corporations without a criminal history to maintain that 
record, since any crime could have more long-term consequences than it 
would if character evidence were prohibited. Allowing character 
evidence for corporations also achieves both of the key goals of 
evidence law: revealing the truth in court and establishing an efficient 
incentive structure that facilitates legal behavior. Considering the 
increased likelihood of accomplishing all of these important goals, 
corporate character evidence should be admitted in criminal trials. 
Given that “[a] company’s culture is its character, and that character 
                                                                                                                     
 274. Leonard, supra note 137, at 1192. 
 275. See Kim, supra note 48, at 779. 
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influences its actions, good and bad,”276 it should also influence juries.  
                                                                                                                     
 276. Gilchrist, supra note 11, at 11 (citation omitted). 
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